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Abstract—Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a common
type of Cybercrime. It can strongly damage a company reputation
and increase its costs. Attackers improve continuously their
strategies. They doubled the amount of unleashed communication
requests in volume, size, and frequency in the last few years.
This occurs against different hosts, causing resource exhaustion.
Previous studies focused on detecting or mitigating ongoing
DDoS attacks. Yet, addressing DDoS attacks when they are
already in place may be too late. In this article, we consider
network resilience by early prediction of attack trends. We
show empirically the advantage of using non-parametric leading
indicators for early prediction of volumetric DDoS attacks. We
report promising results over a real dataset from CAIDA. Our
results raise new questions and opportunities for further research
in early predicting trends of DDoS attacks.
Index Terms—Denial of Service Attacks; Leading Indicators;
Metastability; Prediction; Trends; Resilience.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack is one of the
major threats for Cyberspace. Attackers have intensified ma-
licious DDoS in speed, volume, and sophistication [1]. Their
main goal lies in overloading links or servers. DDoS attacks
can reach volumes of hundreds of Gigabits per second [1],
[2]. For sophistication, attackers take advantage of advances
in computing and communication technologies, by controlling
geographically-distributed infected machines (a.k.a., ‘bots’).
These machines together can produce simultaneously thou-
sands of requests from different Internet connections [3],
making it extremely difficult to detect and prevent the attack.
Detecting, controlling, and restraining volumetric DDoS
attacks are challenging. Attackers constantly enhance their
techniques and produce higher and longer volumes of traffic
congestion. They tend to follow the cycle: infect, coordinate,
and attack [2]. Attackers infect machines with malwares. These
malwares coordinate themselves to define the target, and then
they launch the attack. Bots can learn about the network
behavior, – based on e.g. the current response latency on
servers, – and maliciously use this knowledge. Once coor-
dinated, bots act fast against the target [4]. They launch a
tremendous amount of requests or increase inadvertently the
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size of network packets. These actions lead to overloaded links
or servers.
Several studies have primarily concentrated on paramet-
rically detecting DDoS attacks, e.g., [5], [6]. But, attack
detection approaches are currently limited. Attack behavior
changes constantly and quickly, making difficult to keep
detection systems updated. Hence, mitigation approaches have
sought to reduce the impact of ongoing volumetric DDoS
attacks. These approaches offer flexibility. They apply re-
cent network paradigms, such as software-defined networking
(SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV) [7]. Yet,
mitigation approaches focus on ongoing attacks, but these can
be harder to control. In this work, we advocate for the non-
parametric predicting of trends of DDoS attacks even before
the onsetting of the attack. The non-parametric prediction of
DDoS attack trends complements recent advances in network
security. Trends can serve as a reference for mitigation and
other defense actions.
Ours is a first work that explores leading indicators for
predicting trends of DDoS attacks. We show empirically the
potential of these indicators to provide early warnings of
DDoS attacks. Leading indicators consist of general charac-
teristics observed in advance of disruptive changes [8]. Such
characteristics are tied to metastability phenomena [9]. We
show in this article how to use them to predict changes. By
disruptive change, we mean a critical transition in the network
state, like for instance, when the attack suddenly leads the
network to an unexpected state. This new state can incur
large costs as restoration to the previous state is difficult or
impossible.
We explore empirically a set of classical leading indica-
tors [8]: return rate, autocorrelation, coefficient of variance,
and skewness. In contrast with other works, we employ these
leading indicators in the context of network security. We show
that the indicators can be used to predict trends of volumetric
DDoS attacks. We calculate the leading indicators for time
series. The time series represent the network load by packet
size as a function of time. We extract the time series from
tcpdump traces of a dataset from the Center for Applied
Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA)1. The traces are from a real
DDoS attack. They include only attack traffic to the victim
and responses from the victim. As much as possible, CAIDA
has removed non-attack traffic. We report promising results
from before and during the attack launching time. We evaluate
changes of the leading indicators. Our results discover a set of
1The CAIDA UCSD ”DDoS Attack 2007” Dataset: http://www.caida.org/
data/passive/ddos-20070804 dataset.xml
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2behaviors that are expected and can be used to predict trends
of a disruptive change in the network state. Also, they suggest
a set of relevant questions for future research.
This article proceeds as follows. Section II overviews vol-
umetric flooding-based DDoS attacks. Section III describes
metastability and the leading indicators that we employ. Sec-
tion IV details the method followed in our analyses and
Section V reports the results. Section VI discusses related
work. Finally, Section VII concludes the article.
II. DDOS ATTACKS
A basic DDoS attack consists in flooding a single server
with thousands of requests from bots [1], [2]. Hence, the server
becomes completely overloaded and can no longer respond
to legitimate user requests. The bots are geographically dis-
tributed. They depend on different types of Internet connec-
tions, making it difficult to control attacks. These machines
coordinate themselves in networks (botnets) compounding
their effect.
DDoS attacks have exploited different protocols such as
TCP, HTTP, and DNS to cause significant damage to the
Internet. Lately, attackers have even exploited social networks
and cloud systems to boost DDoS effects [1]. Today, the
use of mobile devices presents new vulnerabilities. These
devices allow attackers to take advantage of device-to-device
wireless communication. This type of communication can
mask malicious code propagation. Then, attackers can recruit a
larger number of bots and increase DDoS attack traffic. These
devices also produce a dynamic and adaptive behavior for the
attack, making it harder to design an effective defense.
The volumetric flooding-based DDoS attack is a specific
type of DDoS. It acts by increasing the number of requests
or packet size. Increasing the number of requests aims at
exhausting server processing, whereas increasing the packet
size has the goal of overloading network resources, such
as bandwidth. In general, attackers increase the number of
requests and packet size simultaneously. Given its simplicity,
this type of DDoS attack is becoming increasingly more
significant [1]. Furthermore, it has compromised different
companies’ websites, resulting often in significant financial
losses.
This article focuses on volumetric flooding-based DDoS
attacks. These attacks are effortless to launch, but they can
have significant power to disrupt the entire state of the
network. We abstract two features for analysis: the number
of requests and packet size. Then, we investigate empirically
the applicability of recently discovered behavior exhibited by
classical non-parametric leading indicators. We will show that
these indicators can help predicting trends of DDoS attacks
even before they effectively start.
III. LEADING INDICATORS FOR DDOS ATTACKS
We show how generic symptoms may indicate a volumetric
flooding-based DDoS attack. To measure such symptoms, we
exploit a set of four classical statistical leading indicators:
return rate, autocorrelation, coefficient of variance, and skew-
ness [8]. In the next subsections, we introduce the concept of
metastability and the leading indicators for such phenomena.
For details about leading indicators, see [8]. Leading indicators
are well known in Statistics [8]. The novelty here lies in
investigating their applicability to predict trends of a disruptive
transition. Their applicability is based on certain properties
found in metastability. More specifically, our work uses lead-
ing indicators to predict trends of volumetric flooding-based
DDoS attacks.
A. Metastability
A system exhibits metastability when it tends to spend a
long time in a particular intermediate state A, a.k.a metastable
state (or metastate), and then eventually it drifts swiftly to
another state B, where it remains now for a long time (or
indefinitely). More precisely, the dynamics of the system can
be partitioned into three (or more) distinct time-scales: i) long-
time at metastate A; ii) rapid transition to a different state B;
iii) staying around B for a long (possibly an infinite amount
of) time. Characterizing metastability requires determining the
metastates, the (random) times that the system spends at each
metastate, and how fast is the transition among them. The
literature on the subject is dominated by empirical studies, as
formal analysis is hard. Observing empirically macroscopic
metastability is far easier than studying it analytically from the
microscopic interactions among agents. For some analytical
approaches on the mathematical formalism of metastability
we refer the reader to [10].
Metastability often arises in systems that exhibit two or
more possible stable states. For instance, consider the frame-
work of diffusion of two (for simplicity, but in practice usually
more) opinions A and B in a social network of individuals,
where every individual exerts some influence upon their peers’
opinions and is influenced by theirs as well. There are at
least two stable states: everyone adopts opinion A or everyone
adopts opinion B. The system may swing swiftly between
the two states depending on exogenous perturbations. We give
an intuitive interpretation of the stable states of a dynamical
system now from an energetic point of view. Each state
corresponds to a certain level of energy, and the stable states
are those local (or global) minima of an energy function as
exemplified in Fig. 1, often referred to as free energy states.
A stochastic system undergoes perturbations about a stable
state, and if the deviations are large enough, it will overcome
a barrier of energy and will drift quickly to another stable
state. A relevant measure of the time it takes for a system to
move from one to another stable state is the return rate that
we discuss next.
As a metastable system undergoes a fast transition – pos-
sibly, to an undesirable state (e.g., blackout in a power grid,
sudden compromising of IoT services, cardiac arrest) – it is
reasonable to respect early-warning signal precursors before
the transition occurs, which in turn can help with controlling
it. More formally, these precursors may be used to flag when
the probability of transition becomes unusually high. It is an
important and subtle aspect of the problem to characterize
such macroscopic observables. Depending on the application,
several heuristic statistics are used in the literature to forecast
3Energy
State Space
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Barrier
Fig. 1: Free energy associated with the state of a system. The
system tends to drift to low energy states and may be trapped
in local minima regions.
a transition beyond the four leading indicators referred to be-
fore [11]. As a general rule, in interacting particle systems [10]
(the framework that formally studies metastability), there are
no broad universal approaches and predictive statistics are
usually crafted targeting each scenario. One exception to the
rule is the seemingly universal usefulness of the return rate. It
measures the irreversibility of a transition, i.e., if the system
is drifting from a metastable state to another.
B. Leading indicators
In this subsection, we explain the four leading indicators
– return rate, autocorrelation, coefficient of variance, and
skewness – from the perspective of a computer network under
a volumetric DDoS attack. Before presenting each one of the
leading indicators, we associate the metastability phenomenon
with a computer network under an attack. Taking Fig. 1 as
basis, imagine the network in a metastable state, as initially
indicated by the blue circle. The DDoS attack can produce a
disturbance in the network state. Disturbances can push the
state towards values that are close to conquering the barrier
between the two metastates. Small disturbances may cause
changes in the network state that may not be enough to make
it to overcome the barrier. If the disturbance is big enough to
potentially push the state across the barrier, this means that
the network state experiences a critical transition.
In this article, we analyze network states based on the
network packet sizes in a time window. Hence, a network
state is characterized by the behavior of a set of network packet
sizes during a time window. Each packet size is observed from
the perspective of the packet destination, and it is indexed per
time unit t (a time series). We consider that each packet is
collected sequentially, hence each packet is labeled by a unique
timestamp. For each time window, we organize the observables
in a matrix, in which the cell contains the packet size per time
unit (matrix column) and packet destination (matrix row). We
have chosen to observe packet size because of the general
behavior of a volumetric DDoS attack. We know that packet
size is a network feature susceptible to attacker manipulation.
Attackers can easily produce fake network packets containing
bigger sizes in order to overload the network bandwidth.
Hence, we take this feature to analyze and investigate the
network behavior and patterns over time.
Now, we start to explain the four leading indicators. The first
one is the rate of return or recovery to equilibrium (return
rate). In technical terms, it is calculated by the dominant
eigenvalues from the matrix composed of the observables
during a time window. The dominant eigenvalues characterize
the rate of change around a metastable state. It can indicate the
proximity of a critical transition. Particularly, it can indicate
the irreversibility of a transition, i.e., if the network state is
drifting from a metastable state to another, overpassing the
barrier. The higher the return rate, the faster the network
recovers from small disturbances around its current state and,
consequently, we say that the network has a high resilience
to change. The return rate is reduced when the network
approaches a critical transition, decreasing smoothly to zero as
the disruptive transition approaches [8]. The smooth reduction
of the return rate close to a critical transition is called Critical
Slowing Down (CSD), a term coined from dynamical systems
theory.
Regarding the second leading indicator, autocorrelation is a
metric employed to evaluate correlation between observables.
It measures how much the network states become increasingly
similar between consecutive observations. Scheffer et. al [8]
observed that the autocorrelation in time series increases when
critical transitions approach. Disruptive transitions tend to
increase the correlation at low lags (also known as ‘short-
term memory’) between observables of the time series. To
be specific, we calculate the autocorrelation at-lag-1, i.e.,
the correlation of the time series to itself shifted one time-
step back. In Eq. 1, the variables zt and zt+1 represent two
consecutive observables at times t and t+ 1, respectively, and
µ the mean in a given time window, and σ is the variance of
the variable zt.
ρ1 =
E[(zt − µ)(zt+1 − µ)]
σ2z
(1)
The third leading indicator is the coefficient of varia-
tion. It is a statistical measure that indicates the level of
variance in a time series. It is calculated as CV = SDµ ,
where SD is the empirical standard deviation calculated by
SD =
√
1
n−1
n∑
t=1
(zt − µ)2. From the literature [8], critical
transitions and the CSD phenomenon increase the variance in
a time series. Hence, together to the other leading indicators,
the coefficient of variance can assist in predicting trends of a
critical transition, in this case a volumetric DDoS attack.
The fourth leading indicator is skewness, a well-known
statistic measure that indicates the asymmetry in the probabil-
ity distribution of observables about its mean. The skewness
value can be positive or negative, or even undefined. In
simplistic terms, the rise in skewness means that the distribu-
tion of the observables will become asymmetric. Skewness is
calculated as illustrated in Eq. 2. Like variance, skewness can
also increase because of a critical transition, meaning that the
asymmetry in the observables increases. This happens because
the dynamics close to the barrier become slow. Scheffer et.
4al [8] have observed a rise in the skewness in different types
of time series, such as time series from Ecology or Finance
systems, when they are close to a critical transition. In this
work, we employ skewness as a leading indicator and it is
analyzed together with the other three.
γ =
1
n
n∑
t=1
(zt − µ)3√
1
n
n∑
t=1
(zt − µ)2
(2)
The return rate and the three statistical measures are em-
ployed as leading indicators about trends of DDoS attacks.
The individual analysis of a single leading indicator should
not be taken as basis for conclusions, in order to reduce
false positives or false negatives. Their analysis should be
performed together. Scheffer et. al [8] have demonstrated in
other domains – e.g., mainly, Ecology and Finance – that
this set of leading indicators presents specific behavior in the
imminence of a critical transition. In summary, they observed
that in the imminence of a disruptive change i) the return
rate decreases; ii) the autocorrelation at-lag-1 increases; iii)
the coefficient of variance increases; and iv) the skewness
increases. In the next section, we employ this set of leading
indicators for the early prediction of volumetric DDoS attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time this theory
is applied to computer networks under DDoS attacks. We
calculate and compare the values for these leading indicators
over one-hour trace from a real DDoS attack.
IV. ATTACK ANALYSIS
We consider the CAIDA “DDoS Attack 2007” dataset
as basis for our analysis. The dataset contains anonymized
traces from a real volumetric DDoS attack (TCP-Like SYN
flooding). The attack occurred on August 4, 2007. It attempts
to block all access to a targeted server. Hence, bots consume
the computing resources of the server. Also, they waste the
network bandwidth connecting the server to the Internet. In
particular, the attack generates a large amount of regular and
oversized SYN packets. As observed from the traces, SYN
packet sizes vary from 60 to 1500 bytes.
The total size of the dataset is 21 GB and it is about one
hour duration (20:50:08 UTC to 21:56:16 UTC). The attack
itself starts around 21:13, as labeled by CAIDA, when the
network load increased rapidly (within a few minutes) from
about 200 kbits/s to about 80 Mbits/s. The one-hour trace is
split in one-minute (0 to 59.99 seconds) time series. The set of
time series was extracted from pcap files by tcpdump filters.
The duration of the time series has been chosen due to the
large amount of data and just to simplify the calculation of the
leading indicators. The size of each time series file varies from
a few Megabytes to Gigabytes. The traces include only attack
traffic to the victim and responses from the victim. CAIDA
has removed as much as possible non-attack traffic. There are
three different moments in the attack timeline. We call these
moments: preparation (Phase 1), attack kickoff, and attack time
(Phase 2). In this work, we concentrate in the preparation
phase and in the attack kickoff, since our goal is to indicate
trends of attack imminence.
In order to estimate leading indicators and analyze their
behavior, time series are composed of a relative time (from 0
to 59.99 seconds) and packet size. The goal lies in employing
relevant but simple features in order to predict the attack
imminence. Features such as packet generation frequency and
packet size can together strongly characterize a volumetric
DDoS attack. High frequencies in packet generation are in
general associated with DDoS; while increases in packet size
indicate that the attacker is trying to cause network saturation.
According to the network protocol, packet sizes should be less
than 250 bytes. However, we observe in the traces, packet sizes
reaching 1500 bytes, mostly when the network is under attack.
Fig. 2 shows two of the time series extracted from the
dataset. They are from different moments in the attack time-
line. The first is from the period before the time indicated by
CAIDA as the beginning of the attack. The second is from the
attack kickoff.
From these time series, one can observe a fast increase in
the packet size (Fig. 2, right). While in the first time series
(Fig. 2, left) the majority of the packets are of 60 bytes, in the
second time series (Fig. 2, right) one can see the transition (at
the red dashed vertical line) from a period in which packets are
of 60 bytes to a period in which the majority of the packets are
1500 bytes. The attack starts at the relative time 30 (i.e., 21:13
UTC) of the second time series (Fig. 2, right) and lasts for
many minutes (not presented in the figure). Another interesting
aspect lies in the two picks (highlighted by the red boxes)
presented in the first time series (Fig. 2, left). Despite the
fact that this time series is from Phase 1, one can observe
few packets of 1500 bytes. We have observed this behavior
in other analyzed time series from Phase 1. We suspect that
they correspond to bots preparing and testing themselves, a
few minutes before launching the attack.
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Fig. 2: Time Series: Packet size vs Relative time. Examples
from the preparation phase (at 20:55)(left) and kickoff time
(at 21:13)(right).
V. RESULTS
This section presents the results from this study in applying
the set of leading indicators to the CAIDA dataset. We
organize the section around two main questions: (1) “Could
we identify trends of the attack at its launching time?” and
(2) “Could we explore leading indicators in the preparation
phase?” These questions guide our analyses and help us to
draw conclusions.
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Fig. 3: Leading Indicators in attack kickoff (at 21:13). Note:
leading indicators do not follow the behavior expected for a
critical transition.
Could we identify trends of the attack at its launching time?
No. We estimated and analyzed the leading indicators at
the attack kickoff. We expected to observe the characteristic
behavior of a disruptive transition at that moment. However,
as one can observe in Fig. 3, the behavior of the leading
indicators is different from those reported in the literature as
characterizing a disruptive transition (see Subsection III-B).
The return rate tends to increase, instead of decreasing, and
then it presents some variation. The lag-1 autocorrelation
decreases, instead of increasing. The coefficient of variation
decreases, instead of increasing, as well as the skewness
distribution. Hence, the behavior for the leading indicators
during the attack kickoff does not reflect an expected behavior
for the imminence of a disruptive transition. We could not
identify trends of the attack at its launching time using these
leading indicators.
Could we explore leading indicators in the preparation phase?
Yes. We examined the leading indicators in different time
series from the preparation phase. Surprisingly, we identified
the disruptive transition behavior, precisely, at the second and
third minutes of the dataset, i.e., 20:51 and 20:52, respectively.
At these minutes, it is already possible to identify suspicious
behavior identified by the leading indicators. A few other
minutes of the dataset in the preparation phase also present this
Return Rate 
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Fig. 4: Leading indicators in the minute 2 (at 20:51) of the
Dataset (Phase 1). Note: the characteristic behavior of a critical
transition approximation - decrease in return rate, and increase
in autocorrelation, coefficient of variation, and skewness.
trending behavior. We do not show all of them in this work
due to limitations in terms of space and number of figures.
However, an illustration of the leading indicators is presented
in Fig. 4. One can observe a decrease in the return rate as well
as increase of the lag-1 autocorrelation, coefficient of variation
and skewness, as expected from the literature characterizing a
disruptive transition.
VI. RELATED WORK
There has been several papers published in early warning
systems in the last few years. In [12], Ramaki and Atani
presented a survey of architectures and techniques for early
warning threats in Information Technology (IT). The authors
classify the early warning systems (EWS) in commercial or
under research and development. They also point out to a set
of current challenges, such as data collection, data correlation,
and post-event data correlation [12]. The authors reinforced the
need for designing proactive solutions to predict threats and
attacks before they occur in the system by using data analytics.
Different studies have particularly tackled the problem of
developing early warning techniques for DDoS attacks [6],
[13], [14]. In [13], Xiao, Chen and He proposed a cooperative
system to produce warning signals. The system is based on a
6Bloom filter technique. The authors’ goal is to reduce storage
and computational resources consumption. In [6], Tsai, Chang
and Huang presented a multilayer system based on time delay
neural networks. Their system is cooperative with each device
in the network monitoring its neighbors. At a certain point,
the device sends the collected data to an expert module. The
module then analyzes all collected data and attempts to match
the received data with known DDoS patterns.
In [14], Korczyn´ski, Hamieh, Huh, Holm, Rajagopalan and
Fefferman presented a cooperative and self-organized anomaly
detection system inspired by colonies of honey bees. Their
goal was to provide dynamic thresholds to detect anomalous
patterns in network traffic. Also, they intended to improve
early intrusion detection in order to assist in mitigation of
attacks.
These works advanced the literature of early warning sys-
tems against DDoS attacks. However, in general, they address
the problem under the perspective of designing a full system.
Our work here complements theirs, because we aim at defining
generic indicators to highlight the possible imminence of
attacks. These indicators can serve as basis for early warning
systems, assisting them in identifying trends of DDoS attacks
before they are fully in place.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article investigates the potential of leading indicators to
early identify trends of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attacks. Leading indicators are a set of generic characteristics
based on mathematical properties related to metastability phe-
nomena observed when approaching a disruption, i.e., a DDoS
attack. This work gives insight about their potential to predict
DDoS attacks trends before their kickoff. Our results with real
data showed that they exhibit specific behaviors before the
onsetting of an attack. These leading indicators, i.e., return
rate, autocorrelation, coefficient of variation, and skewness,
exhibit the characteristic behavior of a critical transition 22
minutes before the attack kickoff. Our study also shows that
the leading indicators did not present this behavior at kickoff
time. These results raise new questions and opportunities
for further investigation regarding early prediction of DDoS
attack trends and how to prevent them efficiently in the
Internet. Further work will focus on investigating different
attack features, that can serve as basis to evaluate the leading
indicators as well as their application to other datasets.
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